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SUMMARY 
Ethiopia: From a Centralised Monarchy to a 
Federal Republic 
Although the Ethiopian state traces its roots back to the empire of 
Axum in the first centuries AD, the modern Ethiopian state took shape 
in the second half of the 19
th century. During that period the territory 
of the Ethiopian empire expanded considerably. Several ethnic groups 
were incorporated into the empire and the foundations for a strong, 
centralised state were laid. Centralisation of authority in the hands of 
the emperor and a strategy of nation building that denied the ethnic 
diversity of Ethiopian society characterised the rule of Emperor Haile 
Selassie. At the same time, these elements contributed to its decline. 
Haile Selassie was ultimately deposed by a military committee in 
1974. This announced the end of the Ethiopian monarchy and the 
13 transformation of the Ethiopian state, following the Marxist model. In 
spite of Marxist-Leninist attention to the 'nationalities issue', Ethiopia 
remained a centralised state, dominated by one ethnic identity. This 
gave rise to increasing resistance from various regional and ethnic 
liberation movements. The combined effort of these movements caused 
the fall of military rule in May 1991. The new regime, which was 
dominated by ethnically organised parties, initiated a radical trans-
formation of the Ethiopian state structure that leads to the 
establishment of a federation in 1995. 
Key Words: Ethiopia, Political Development, Constitutional 
Development, State Structure 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although the historical origins of the Ethiopian state can be traced 
back thousands of years, the development of the Ethiopian polity as 
indicated in the title took place entirely during the last few decades. 
Until deep into the twentieth century, Ethiopia was governed by an 
emperor who based the legitimacy of his power on his descent from a 
mythical king who lived in the tenth century before Christ. As such, 
the Ethiopian monarch carried on an age-old governance tradition, a 
tradition which was not even interrupted by European colonial 
expansion at the end of the nineteenth century. The Ethiopian army 
put a (provisional) end to Italian colonial claims in 1896 and ensured 
Ethiopian national sovereignty, also with regard to other European 
colonial powers. For the Ethiopian empire, the end of the nineteenth 
century witnessed not only the preservation of its independence, but 
also considerable expansion of its traditional territory; expansion 
which delineated the extent of the territory of the Ethiopian state. The 
shaping of the new empire was followed by increasing centralisation 
of state power, whereby the emperor concentrated all power in his 
own hands. The culmination of imperial power was attained during 
the rule of Emperor Haile Selassie (1930-1974). However, the 
elements which founded imperial authority at the same time caused its 
decline. In the 1960s, armed conflicts arose in different regions of the 
empire and students nurtured the ideas which provided the ideological 
ammunition for resistance against the imperial regime. This weakened 
the regime and in 1974 it was not able to react appropriately to the 
14 flow of protests and related demands, caused by international and 
national events. The crumbling state apparatus collapsed and Emperor 
Haile Selassie was deposed in September 1974. This meant the end for 
the monarchy in Ethiopia. State power was assumed by a military 
committee which was inspired by Marxism-Leninism. The new rulers 
established a 'People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia' and 
announced a more decentralised exercise of state power. However, 
this state reform did not prevent government power from remaining 
strongly centralised. Although the military committee took some 
radical social measures, it did not offer satisfactory solutions to the 
problems which had accelerated the downfall of Haile Selassie. 
Moreover, some of these problems were even reinforced by the 
actions of the military. Therefore, from the beginning of its time in 
power, the military regime had to deal with the actions of armed 
resistance movements. After a long civil war, the regime was finally 
defeated in May 1991. The most striking reform undertaken by the 
new power holders - the former resistance movements - became the 
transformation of the unitary state into a federal state with nine 
member states. 
The present article offers a concise overview of these three different 
phases in recent Ethiopian political and constitutional history: the 
imperial period, the period of the military regime and the period of the 
federal republic, the current phase in Ethiopian history. The discussion 
of the first and second phases (in sections 2 and 3 respectively) mainly 
serves to provide a better understanding of the third phase, the current 
Ethiopian political and constitutional context which is then examined 
in section 4. 
2. THE EMPIRE OF ETHIOPIA 
As already indicated in the introduction, until the 20th century the 
Ethiopian monarchy appealed to a mythical descent, the so-called 
Salomonic tradition. This tradition was still explicitly incorporated in 
the 1955 Ethiopian constitution, which was drafted and enacted during 
the rule of Haile Selassie: "The Imperial Dignity shall remain perpe-
tually attached to the line of Haile Selassie I, descendent of King 
Sahle Selassie, whose line descends without interruption from the 
15 dynasty of Menelik I, son of the Queen of Ethiopia, the Queen of 
Sheba, and King Salomon of Jerusalem. " It is an undeniable fact that 
the Ethiopian monarchy was an age-old institution which traced its 
roots back to the Empire of Axum.
1 The empire of Axum, located in 
today's northern Ethiopia, flourished in the first centuries after Christ 
and controlled important territories in the Red Sea region. Because of 
the territorial scope of their powers, the Icings of Axum considered 
themselves kings of kings, or emperors. Through the Red Sea trade, 
Axum came into contact with the culture of the Mediterranean area. 
These contacts offer an explanation for the introduction of Christianity 
in Axum, in the fourth century AD. Christianity, in its orthodox form, 
became the state religion of Axum and would, together with imperial 
rule, develop into a constant factor in Ethiopian society. The expan-
sion of Islam caused Axum to lose control over the Red Sea region. 
Axum (photo by the author) 
Today, the remnants of the empire can still be visited in the town of Axum, in the 
Tigray region. 
16 As such, from the 7th century onwards, the empire declined and, 
isolated from the outside world, it withdrew to more southern 
territories in the interior. In the following centuries, a Christian empire 
continued to exist, though with large fluctuations in its position of 
power. In the 16th century, for instance, the Christian empire was 
seriously threatened by a devastating Moslem invasion. But internal 
developments also impacted upon the authority of the imperial 
government. In the middle of the 18th century, though an empire with 
its seat of power at Gondar
2 still existed, there was no centralisation of 
power in the hands of the emperor. Real power in the empire was 
exercised by the regional lords. There was a complete fragmentation 
of power where the different component principalities of the empire 
vied for predominance. This period (which is called the Zemene 
Mesafmt or the era of the princes) lasted to the middle of the 19th 
century. In that period a counter-reaction in favour of restoration of 
the central authority was initiated. As indicated in the introduction, 
this counter-reaction would culminate in the absolute and centralised 
power of Emperor Haile Selassie in the 20
t
h century. 
Gondar (photo by the author) 
2 Today a town in the Amhara region. 
17 The year 1855 is usually seen as the year in which the Zemene 
Mesafint came to an end. It is the year in which Kassa Hailu, a 
nobleman from Qwara in Western Ethiopia, was crowned Emperor 
Theodoros II. Emperor Theodoras is considered the founder of 
modern Ethiopia.
3 The rule of Emperor Theodoros created a break 
with the era of the princes. This break was not so much expressed in 
effective achievements as in ambitious objectives. Theodoros intended 
to unite the various principalities from the era of the princes under his 
ultimate authority. For that purpose he tried to establish a centralised 
administration and a central army. Both the administration of the 
empire and its military were exercised in a fragmented manner under 
the control of the regional lords and Theodoros did not succeed in 
carrying out his ambitious reforms. He particularly lacked the required 
financial resources. Moreover, his position was undemiined by 
various regional rebellions. It was only by conducting continuous 
military campaigns that he managed to stay in power. However, the 
use of brutal violence only increased resistance to his regime. His 
attempts to reinforce his administration internally also caused external 
difficulties. In the end, he asked the British for support. Theodoros 
justified this request by referring to the common Christian tradition of 
both countries. When the British reacted unenthusiastically, 
Theodoros went to the extent of taking British envoys hostage. This 
decision turned out to be fatal, because the military mission which was 
sent by the British in reaction to Theodoros
1 action, sealed the fate of 
the emperor in 1868. The army of Theodoros, seriously weakened by 
the internal problems, was no match for the British. Theodoros 
realised that all was lost and he committed suicide. C. Clapham 
evaluates the period of government of Theodoros as follows: "The 
reign (of Theodoros) is, however, memorable more for its aspirations 
than for its achievements. '
A 
3 E. J. KELLER, Revolutionary Ethiopia - From Empire to People's Republic, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1988,21. 
4 C. CLAPHAM, Haile-Selassie's Government, New York/Washington, PRAEGER, 
1970, 12. 
18 In 1872, after a short succession struggle, Kassa Mercha from Tigray 
was crowned the new emperor. The new emperor adopted the name of 
Yohannes IV. Emperor Yohannes shared with Theodoras the dream of 
a strong unified empire. To this end, he used a different strategy than 
Theodoras, a strategy which proved much more successful. Theodoros 
tried to create a unified Ethiopia by undermining the power of the 
regional lords and filling the resulting power vacuum with strong 
imperial authority. As shown in the previous paragraph, Theodoros 
never succeeded in achieving this. Yohannes, however, learned from 
the mistakes of Theodoros and tried to reinforce his position, not by 
undermining the authority of the regional lords, but by recognising 
and using this authority as the basis for central power. However, the 
acceptance of regional autonomy went together with the requirement 
that the regional lords recognise the ultimate power of the emperor. 
One of the consequences of this policy was that Menelik, king of 
Shoa, could establish a firm power base. Already during the rale of 
Yohannes, Menelik conquered large territories to the east, west and 
south of Shoa and incorporated them into his kingdom - and thus into 
the empire.
5 Concerning the strategy of Yohannes, one has to point out 
that international developments had created a context that was not 
favourable for conducting a centralisation policy. During his rale, 
Yohannes was confronted with several threats to Ethiopia's national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the 1880s, after having 
successfully defeated the Egyptians in the 1870s, Emperor Yohannes 
was confronted with the colonial ambitions of Italy. Italy had become 
a unified state only very recently and the new state aimed to establish 
a colonial empire, following the example of other European states. A 
war with Italy was imminent, but Yohannes chose to postpone the 
armed conflict with the Italians and to give priority to the fight against 
the Sudanese Mahdists who had invaded Ethiopia and plundered 
Gondar. Yohannes was eventually killed in a battle against the 
Mahdists at Metemma in March 1889. 
As soon as he was informed of the death of the emperor, king Menelik 
of Shoa, the most powerful of the regional lords, declared himself 
5 TEFERRA HAILE-SELASSIE, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974 - 1991 From a 
Monarchical Autocracy to a Military Oligarchy, London/New York, Kegan Paul 
International, 1997,23. 
19 emperor. Ironically, the dominant position of Menelik had been 
considerably reinforced during the reign of Yohannes by weapon 
supplies from the Italians. This was part of an Italian divide and rule 
policy that supported Menelik in order to weaken the position of 
emperor Yohannes. Therefore, the relationship between the Italians 
and Menelik initially seemed to be friendly. However, when it became 
clear that the Italians did not only have colonial claims on Eritrea -
claims which had been recognised by Menelik in 1889 - but that they 
wanted to establish a protectorate over the entire Ethiopian empire, 
relations between the two parties soured rapidly. The Italians refused 
to withdraw their colonial claims; the conflict escalated and 
eventually, in 1896, it erupted into a battle between the armies of 
Menelik and the Italians at Adua (in the Tigray region). To the 
consternation of the confident Italians and many other European 
countries, convinced as they were of European superiority, the 
Ethiopians crushed the Italian army.
6 The victory at Adua was 
extremely important for the further development of the Ethiopian 
state. Italy recognised Ethiopian independence and in other European 
countries an attitude of respect towards Ethiopia arose. The victory at 
Adua was therefore an important psychological element of successful 
Ethiopian resistance against European colonial expansion. Emperor 
Menelik not only played a central role in the protection of Ethiopia's 
national sovereignty, but he was also the driving force behind a large 
territorial expansion which gave the Ethiopian state its current 
borders. As indicated above, already during the reign of Yohannes, 
Menelik had conquered large territories. After his coronation, Menelik 
continued these conquests and incorporated several other areas and 
peoples into his empire. The victory at Adua had instilled such an atti-
tude of respect amongst the colonial powers that they recognised these 
new borders in a range of agreements. The formation of the modern 
Ethiopian state is not therefore the result of external imperialistic 
design. However, it is appropriate to mention that the conquests of the 
pre-colonial empire showed clear parallels with the actions of the 
European colonisers.
7 The conquests meant that numerous peoples 
with several languages, religions (Islam, traditional religions), 
6 H.G. MARCUS, A History of Ethiopia, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, University 
of California Press, 2002, 97. 
7 E.J. KELLER, o.c, 36. 
20 cultures, socio-economic activities and governance structures became 
part of the Ethiopian empire. It was the end of the - numerical -
dominance of orthodox Christians who had been using Amharic as 
their most important language for centuries. Ethiopia became a state 
with a multi-ethnic population, a characteristic which is shared by the 
Ethiopian state and most African states formed by European 
colonisation. The conquered peoples, of which most lived to the south 
of the traditional Ethiopian heartland, were not treated as equals in 
relation to the northern conquerors, but were subject to its political, 
economic and cultural dominance. The northern conquerors, though 
themselves belonging to several ethnic groups (such as the Tigrayans, 
Oromo and Amhara), were all perceived as Amhara by the conquered 
peoples. This was a consequence (after the coronation of Menelik) of 
the renewed dominance of the Shoa Amhara in the empire.
8 The 
territorial expansion at the end of the 19
t
h century was an extremely 
important phase in Ethiopian history, since there the germ was laid for 
the ethnic tensions and the rhetoric about Amhara dominance which 
would strongly come to the fore at the end of the imperial regime. An 
important factor in the oppression of the conquered peoples was the 
land scheme. The conquered peoples lost their traditional rights to 
land and their role was reduced to cultivating the land and providing 
goods and services to the holders of the land, who were mainly 
military commanders and soldiers with an Amhara identity. 
Within the new boundaries of the empire, Menelik implemented the 
development of a more centralised administration.
9 As such, he partly 
realised the dream which had been nourished by his predecessor 
Theodoros. Stronger centralisation was realised by the appointment of 
provincial governors by the emperor. It was especially in the newly 
conquered territories that the emperor had discretionary competence to 
appoint and remove governors. In the traditional heartland of the 
empire the emperor had to take into account the power basis of local 
aristocratic families. He also took steps in the direction of creating a 
professional, salaried army. Traditionally, the Ethiopian army 
consisted of soldiers who, in times of war, were provided by the 
regional lords. These soldiers were not paid, but had to. live off what 
The dominance of Tigray had ended with the death of Emperor Yohannes IV. 
9 GHELAWDEWOS ARAIA, Ethiopia - The Political Economy of Transition, 
Lanham/New York/London, University Press of America, 1995, 25. 
21 they could acquire from the local population during military 
campaigns. Menelik tried to develop a more centralised command 
structure and initiated the practice of paying a salary to the soldiers.
1
0 
In spite of these reforms, the regional lords preserved vast powers 
during the reign of Menelik. It is only under Haile Selassie that they 
became entirely subordinate to the imperial authority. The illness and 
death of Menelik in 1913 caused a succession struggle which con-
tinued during the short and tumultuous reign of Lij Iyasu, the 
grandson of Menelik. After the deposition of Lij Iyasu on charges of 
apostasy
1
1 in 1916, Zawditu, Menelik's daughter, was crowned 
empress. The empress, who had little interest in politics, left the daily 
administration of the empire to Ras Tafari, the later Emperor Haile 
Selassie. It was he, and not the empress, who determined Ethiopian 
internal and foreign policy. When Zawditu died in April 1930 it was 
therefore to be expected that Tafari would be crowned emperor. The 
new emperor adopted the name Haile Selassie. 
Even in the first few years of his reign, Emperor Haile Selassie took a 
number of initiatives which expressed his ambition to replace the 
traditional, decentralised governance structure with "modern" centra-
lised state machinery. One of the most important initiatives was the 
proclamation of a constitution in 1931. The aim of reducing the 
fragmentation of power and to centralise all powers with the emperor 
could already be inferred from article 1 of the constitution that stated: 
"The territory of Ethiopia, in its entirety, is from one end to the other, 
subject to the Government of his Majesty the Emperor. " 
1
0 E.J. KELLER, o.c, 38. 
1
1 Lij Iyasu was accused of converting to Islam. This was a major issue since the 
emperor was obliged to profess his faith in Orthodox Christianity, the state religion. 
According to the prominent historian Bahru Zewde the overture of Lij Iyasu to Islam 
should rather be seen as an attempt to integrate Moslems into the empire; BAHRU 
ZEWDE, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855 - 1991, Oxford, James Currey, 2001, 
124. 
22 Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia (http://www.images.google.be) 
That the ultimate power in the empire was to be exercised by the 
emperor was confirmed by article 6: "In the Ethiopian Empire 
supreme power rests in the hands of the emperor. " Another constitu-
tional provision which served the emperor's aim of greater centrali-
sation was the establishment of a senate as one of the two chambers of 
the parliament. The senate was composed of important members of 
the nobility, who were appointed by the emperor. Because of their 
presence in Addis Ababa the regional lords could be checked more 
easily by the emperor and at the same time they were removed from 
their regional power bases, which resulted in weakening their political 
position.
1
2 The reform process was interrupted by the invasion of 
Italian troops in 1935. The installation of the fascist regime in Italy led 
to renewed interest in a colonial empire. Fascist Italy wanted to erase 
the stain of Adua and to incorporate Ethiopia into its colonial empire. 
Mussolini decided to attack Ethiopia and in October 1935 Italian 
troops marched into Ethiopian territory. This time the Ethiopian army 
was no match for the better-armed Italians and in May 1936 Italian 
troops conquered Addis Ababa. Haile Selassie fled the country and 
1
2 FASIL NAHUM, Constitution for a nation of nations: the Ethiopian prospect, 
Lawrenceville/Asmara, The Red Sea Press, 1997, 21. 
23 went into exile in Great Britain.
1
3 However, the infringement of 
Ethiopia's national sovereignty was of a short duration. By 1941 the 
Italian occupier was ousted, with British support. Haile Selassie was 
able to return to Ethiopia where he continued his policy of 
centralisation. Important developments in this context included 
elements which had also been postulated by Theodoros: the esta-
blishment of a centralised administration (from then on each province 
was administered by a governor-general appointed by the emperor) 
and the formation of a more professional, central army.
1
4 The 
centralisation policy of Haile Selassie was accompanied by attempts 
to develop a nation state in Ethiopia based on the European model. 
The strategy that was developed for that purpose was not based on the 
diversity of the Ethiopian population, but in contrast involved attempts 
to impose the culture, language and religion of one ethnic group on all 
the other groups.
1
5 Within the Ethiopian nation state there was no 
space for the ethnic diversity which had been a particular feature of 
Ethiopian society since the conquests of Menelik. The regime strived 
to erase the ethnic identity of the non-Amhara peoples and to replace 
it with an Amhara identity. The language of the Amhara, then culture 
and religion (Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity) were strongly propa-
gated and idealised and all other languages, cultures and religions 
were denigrated. It was the Amhara elite, primarily the elite from the 
central region of Shoa, which had exercised power since the death of 
Yohannes TV and the subsequent accession to the throne of Menelik. 
Important elements in the policy of Amharisation were imperial 
administration and education which exclusively used the Amhara 
language, Amharic.
1
6 The spread of Amharic and Amhara culture 
through the administration and through education had an important 
negative impact on the other languages and cultures. Non-Amhara 
peoples were not only subjected to economic (the loss of traditional 
1
3 BAHRU ZEWDE, o.c, 150-160; H.G. MARCUS, o.c, 138-146; TEFERRA 
HAILE- SEL AS SIE, o.c, 38-40. 
1
4 BAHRU ZEWDE, "Hayla-Sellase: From Progressive to Reactionary" in ABEBE 
ZEGEYE and S. PAUSEWANG (eds.), Ethiopia in Change - Peasantry, Nationalism 
and Democracy, London/New York, British Academic Press, 1994, (30) 34. 
1
5 E.J. KELLER, o.c, 136. 
1
6 With regards to education it has to be noted that Amharic was only used as the 
language of instruction in primary education; the language of instruction in secondary 
and higher education was English; E.J. KELLER, o.c, 140. 
24 land rights, see above), cultural, linguistic and religious oppression, 
but they also had to accept Amhara political dominance. For non-
Amhara peoples the learning of Amharic and the adoption of Amhara 
culture, tradition and religion were necessary steps to develop a career 
within the state administration. However, the central features of Haile 
Selassie's policy, centralisation and Amharisation, did not appear to be 
suitable instruments to achieve an efficient and stable state. On the 
contrary, both elements were strongly contested as from the 1960s. 
They stimulated violent theoretical discussions about "the nationalities 
issue" as well as the rise of several regional and ethnic rebellions. 
Rebellions - where the dissatisfaction with an Amhara dominated 
centralised state was an important factor - arose especially in Eritrea 
and among the Somali and Oromo peoples from Bale. After the Italian 
claims on Eritrea had been recognised by Menelik, Eritrea became an 
Italian colony in 1890. In parallel with developments in Ethiopia, 
Eritrea was liberated from the Italians in 1941. The British admi-
nistered Eritrea, whilst awaiting a final decision concerning the statute 
of the former Italian colony. On 2 December 1950, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations approved Resolution 390 A (V). This 
resolution provided for a federal link between Eritrea and the Ethio-
pian empire. The federal link was legally laid down in an Eritrean 
constitution which was approved by an Eritrean constituent assembly 
in July 1952.
1
7 This constitution granted important powers to Eritrea, 
provided for an Eritrean flag and stated that Tigrigna and Arabic 
would be the official languages. Furthermore, the constitution provi-
ded for Eritrean legislative, executive and judicial bodies.
1
8 However, 
1
7 TEKESTE NEGASH, Eritrea and Ethiopia - The Federal Experience, Uppsala, 
Nordiska Afrikamstitutet, 1997, 75. 
1
8 The contradictions between the Eritrean constitution and the Ethiopian constitution 
of 1931 contributed to the revision of the latter in 1955. One of the differences 
concerned the election of parliamentarians. The Ethiopian constitution of 1931 
provided for the establishment of a two-chamber parliament: the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies. As mentioned above the senate was composed of important 
members of the nobility, who were appointed by the emperor. The members of the 
Chamber of Deputies were elected by the nobility and the local chiefs" until the 
people are in a position to elect them themselves" (art. 32 Constitution of 1931). 
However, the members of the Eritrean assembly were elected on the basis of universal 
suffrage (limited to men). The 1955 Ethiopian constitution also created a chamber of 
deputies where the members were elected on the basis of universal suffrage (for men 
and women). 
25 the federal structure was at odds with the centralist objectives of Haile 
Selassie. The Chief Executive - the head of the Eritrean executive - for 
instance, was elected by the Eritrean assembly instead of being 
appointed by the emperor.
1
9 Therefore, from the beginning the 
emperor strived to curtail Eritrean autonomy. This was expressed by 
the introduction of Amharic as the official language, to the detriment 
of Tigrigna and Arabic and was thus contrary to the Eritrean consti-
tution. The destruction of Eritrean autonomy was sealed in 1962 with 
the decision of the Eritrean assembly (acting under strong Ethiopian 
pressure) to dissolve the federation.
2
0 This triggered an independence 
struggle which was initially conducted by the ELF (Eritrean 
Liberation Front) and later increasingly by the EPLF (Eritrean 
People's Liberation Front). In the course of the 1960s the imperial 
regime also had to face a revolt of Oromo and Somali in Bale, a 
province in south-eastern Ethiopia. This revolt grew from the 
resistance against Amharisation and was strengthened by dissatis-
faction with the dorninance of Orthodox Christianity over Islam, the 
shared religion of the Oromo and Somali rebels. The regional (in 
Eritrea) and ethnically inspired conflicts stimulated the growth of an 
ethnic awareness in Ethiopia. This was clearly visible within the 
Ethiopian student movement. In the middle of the 1960s students had 
demanded far-reaching reforms of the land scheme and a few years 
later they contested the official strategy of nation building. The 
students thus played an important role in undermining the legitimacy 
of the imperial regime. The major difficulties for the regime, however, 
occurred as from 1974. The inadequate response of the government to 
a terrible famine and to the international oil crisis further undermined 
the already shaky position of the imperial administration. In the first 
months of 1974, there were numerous street protests by diverse 
segments of the Ethiopian population. The government was not able to 
control the swelling flow of protests and related demands and also lost 
the support of the army. A military committee (Derg, in Amharic), 
consisting of representatives from several sections of the army, took 
power in the course of 1974 and deposed the emperor in September 
Article 68 (1) 1952 Constitution of Eritrea. 
TEKESTENEGASH, o.c, 138. 
26 1974. The constitution of 1955 (see footnote 18) was also 
suspended. 
3. THE MILITARY REGIME 
The Derg had now ended the regime of Haile Selassie, but initially it 
was not clear which political system the Derg was going to replace it 
with. However, soon the Derg came under pressure from different 
Marxist inspired groupings, including those of students, which 
demanded the resignation of the military and the formation of a 
civilian government.
2
2 To weaken these critical voices and to acquire 
greater support from the people, the Derg became increasingly 
radical.
2
3 This radicalisation was confirmed by the ten point pro-
gramme that was proclaimed by the Derg on 20 December 1974. This 
programme made clear that "Ethiopian socialism" would serve as an 
ideological guiding principle for Derg policies. In view of this, on 1 
January 1975 the Derg decided, and as such implementing Ethiopian 
socialism, to nationalise private banks and insurance companies.
2
4 The 
measure with the largest social impact
2
5 however was the nationa-
lisation of all rural land which was legally laid down in Proclamation 
No. 31 of 4 March 1975: "A Proclamation to provide for the public 
ownership of rural lands. "
26 This law put an end to the anachronistic 
naftanya scheme
2
7 that had been installed in a lot of southern areas 
during the rule of Menelik and that had continued to exist under Haile 
Selassie. As such, the military regime dealt with the demands which 
C. CLAPHAM, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, 39-40. 
2
2 C. CLAPHAM, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, 45. 
2
3 E.J. KELLER, o.c, 192. 
2
4 ANDARGACHEW TIRUNEH, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987, 
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27 had been formulated by the Ethiopian students in the middle of the 
1960s (see section 2). The land reform of 4 March 1975 did not only 
fit the ideological framework of Ethiopian socialism, but was also 
aimed at acquiring support among the people.
2
8 The law provided for 
the establishment of Peasant Associations, local governments which 
were charged with the execution of the land reform. The land reform 
was especially welcomed in the southern regions. As mentioned in 
section 2, many southern peasant families had lost their traditional 
land rights during the imperial period. These peasants thus hoped that 
the land reform would result in the restoration of their control over the 
lands and in an improvement of their economic position.
2
9 During the 
first few years after the land reform these expectations materialised. 
Initially, the Peasant Associations were truly representative organs of 
the peasants. The peasants elected their leaders freely and, because of 
this, they cotild exert substantial influence over local matters. 
However, this situation did not last long. After a few years peasant 
control of the Peasant Associations was replaced by a tight control by 
the central government. From bodies of local self-ad^ninistration the 
Peasant Associations were transformed into instruments of central 
control. In the first few years after the land reform the economic posi-
tion of the peasants visibly improved. The growing interference of the 
state in the agricultural sector ensured, however, that this result of the 
land reform also did not last. 
In section 2, I indicated how the policies of Amharisation and 
centralisation played an important role in the undermining of the 
monarchy. The fact that the Derg, influenced by Marxist movements, 
followed a clear Marxist-Leninist ideology had its consequences on its 
approach towards the ethnic issue. In the "Programme of the National 
Democratic Revolution" (PNDR), a political programme that was 
adopted by the Derg on 20 April 1976 and that replaced the ten-point 
programme of 20 December 1974, a much more positive attitude 
towards ethnic diversity came to the fore.
3
0 The multi-ethnic 
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28 composition of the Ethiopian population was no longer denied. Also, 
proposals were formulated to remedy the distorted ethnic relations. 
The cultural oppression of the non-Amhara groups had to be remedied 
by the equal treatment of the history, culture, language and religion of 
each ethnic group. But just as the land reform did not lead to an 
improvement of the life of the peasant, the rhetoric of the PNDR did 
not give rise to substantial changes in ethnic relations. There was no 
clear weakening of Amhara dominance. This was not only the case in 
the field of language and culture
31, regional autonomy equally did not 
fit the centralisation trend which had put the Peasant Associations 
under central control.
3
2 In spite of the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, Ethio-
pia remained a centralised, Amhara dominated state. This situation, 
coupled with an extremely violent repression, resulted in the regime 
(from 1977 onwards under the tight control of Mengistu Haile 
Mariam) finding itself under increasing pressure from regional and 
ethnic resistance movements. 
One of the movements which at a certain point formed a threat to 
Ethiopia's territorial integrity was the WSLF (Western Somali 
Liberation Front). The WSLF was a movement which fought for the 
secession of the Ogaden region in Eastern Ethiopia and for the subse-
quent inclusion of this region in the republic of Somalia. The Ogaden 
formed part of the territories that were conquered by Emperor Menelik 
at the end of the 19
t
h century. As such, the Ogaden Somali were 
separated from the Somali who lived outside the borders of the empire 
(in Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya). After their incorporation into the 
Ethiopian empire the Ogaden Somali continued to nourish strong 
nationalist feelings. The attempts of Haile Selassie to integrate the 
Somali within the Ethiopian empire, essentially an application of his 
Amharisation policy, could not erase Somali nationalism.
3
3 
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29 Mengistu Haile Mariam (wvw.dictatorofthemonmxom/Mengistu) 
The WSLF was supported in its irredentist policies by the republic of 
Somalia. The republic of Somalia strived for the unification of all 
Somali (not only the Ogaden Somali, but also the Somali from Kenya 
and Djibouti) into one large Somalia. In 1977, troops of the republic 
even invaded Ethiopia to support the WSLF. Soon the well-equipped 
army of Somalia - thanks to Soviet military assistance - was able to 
control the largest part of the Ogaden. However, the ever-more clearer 
Marxist-Leninist orientation of the Derg resulted in closer links 
between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. This paved the way for far-
reaching military cooperation between both countries - cooperation 
which led to a decisive turn in the Ethiopia-Somalia war. The military 
assistance of the Soviet Union as well as the active participation of 
Cuban troops in the war resulted in the ousting of Somalia's troops 
from Ethiopian territory in early 1978. After the end of the war, the 
activities of the Somali liberation movements in the Ogaden during 
the Derg regime would remain restricted to sporadic guerrilla and 
sabotage activities.
3
4 Ethiopian territorial integrity was also threatened 
by the growing Oromo nationalism. This nationalism had already been 
an important factor in the Bale revolt (see section 2) and was not 
tempered by Derg policies. Initially however, the Derg received a lot 
of support from the Oromo population. The land reform of 1975 ended 
the naftanya scheme (see footnote 27) that had condemned many 
E.J. KELLER, o.c, 207. 
30 generations of Oromo to a slave-like existence. The land reform not 
only ended Amhara economic exploitation, through the Peasant 
Associations the peasants received a certain amount of local autonomy 
that liberated them from Amhara political supremacy. Moreover, the 
PNDR created expectations regarding the improvement of ethnic rela-
tions. However, as has already been indicated in the two previous 
paragraphs, neither the land reform nor the rhetorical concern for the 
ethnic problem led to substantial changes. This situation led to 
growing success for the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front). The Oromo 
Liberation Front fought for an independent Oromia. According to the 
OLF, the territories inhabited by the Oromo had been colonised by the 
Arnhara-dominated state at the end of the 19
t
h century.
3
5 Eventually 
the OLF, in spite of its potential (the Oromo are the largest ethnic 
group in Ethiopia), contributed little to the struggle against the Derg. 
The OLF never managed to grow into an organisation representative 
of all Oromo.
3
6 
In Eritrea, however, the EPLF could provide a substantial contribution 
to the gradual weakening of the Derg army. In section 2 I mentioned 
that the independence fight was initially conducted by the ELF. The 
ELF was particularly supported by Eritrean Moslems. The ELF had a 
pan-Arabic and pan-Islamic ideology, which generated a lot of support 
from the Arab world, but which at the same time laid at the basis of a 
difficult relationship with the Eritrean Christians who increasingly 
revolted against Ethiopian control.
3
7 The antagonisms between 
Moslems and Christians within the ELF were an important cause of 
the fragmentation of this organisation and at the beginning of the 
1970s the EPLF, which was supported by Eritrean Christians, was 
established. Initially the Derg took a reconciliatory attitude towards 
the Eritrean problem, but the radicalisation of the military committee 
caused the Derg to leave the path of reconciliation and to opt for 
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31 military repression of the independence struggle. The repressive 
approach of the Derg greatly stimulated the growth of Eritrean 
nationalism. The invasion of the Somalian army in the Ogaden 
weakened the Derg army in Eritrea so that at the end of 1977 the 
Eritrean liberation movements controlled the largest part of Eritrean 
territory. However, after the victory of Ethiopia against Somalia, the 
Derg was able to move its military attention to Eritrea and to 
reconquer most of the lost territories. The ELF was as good as 
defeated, but the EPLF persisted and would, together with the TPLF 
(Tigray People's Liberation Front) develop into one of the greatest 
threats to the Derg regime. The TPLF was set up in 1975 by Tigrayan 
students who were strongly influenced by the views of the Ethiopian 
student movement. The TPLF, just as most important Ethiopian 
political groups of that time, had a Marxist-Lerrinist ideology and 
presented itself as a movement which fought for the right to self-
determination for the Tigrayans.
3
9 Initially, the TPLF equated self-
determination with independence, but soon the establishment of an 
independent republic of Tigray was no longer the ultimate objective of 
the TPLF. The liberation struggle now aimed "To eliminate national 
domination and restore the national rights of the Tigrayan people."
40 
Tigrayan nationalism, which was based on common characteristics in 
the field of language (Tigrigna), culture and tradition, was efficiently 
used by the TPLF as a mobilising instrument in its liberation struggle. 
The TPLF, together with the EPLF, developed into the most important 
resistance movement against the Derg. It has to be noted though that 
this successful mobilisation would not have been possible if the TPLF 
had not coupled the abstract objective of self-determination with 
concrete actions to improve conditions for the Tigrayan population. 
In spite of the enormous deployment of military resources, the Derg 
did not succeed in breaking the resistance of the liberation 
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32 movements. Because of this, the Derg started to turn its attention to a 
peaceful resolution of the various ethnic and regional conflicts. In 
February 1987 a new constitution was approved, as such ending a 
period of thirteen years in which Ethiopia was governed without a 
constitution (the constitution of 1955 had been suspended when the 
Derg took power in September 1974).
4
1 The new constitution, which 
established a People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), 
contained several provisions which reflected a concern for the 
complaints of the ethnically and regionally organised rebellion 
movements, without however abolislring the unitary state structure. 
Independence for Eritrea or even federalism was excluded, although it 
was stated that within the unitary state "all nationalities live in 
equality.
,A2 The PDRE would guarantee linguistic diversity
43, despite 
article 116 of the constitution which stated: "State activities shall be 
conducted in the Amharic language. " Furthermore, article 59 of the 
constitution provided for the establishment of autonomous and admi-
nistrative regions. Although these new administrative entities were 
allocated powers such as the drawing up of social and economic plans, 
the drawing up of a regional budget and the election of regional 
judges, they had a subordinate position towards the central govern-
ment. 
The provisions of the new constitution were therefore not able to 
extinguish the revolutionary fire. On the contrary, from 1988 onwards 
there was a remarkable weakening in the position of Mengistu (who 
came to personify the Derg). In the course of 1988, the morale of the 
Derg troops was seriously damaged by the military successes of both 
the TPLF and the EPLF. At the beginning of 1989 the TPLF 
succeeded in gaining control of the largest part of Tigray. Subse-
quently, The TPLF decided to widen its objectives and to extend its 
actions to areas outside of Tigray, in order to bring about the complete 
downfall of the Derg. The TPLF, however, only represented a small 
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33 part of the Ethiopian population (the Tigrayans) and, to rally other 
peoples behind its struggle, the TPLF in 1989 created the EPRDF 
(Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front). With the 
creation of the EPRDF, the TPLF's aim was the formation of a broad 
coalition of ethnically based parties. The fact that the EPRDF was not 
conceived as a multinational organisation, but as a coalition of several 
ethnic parties, was entirely consistent with the emphasis that was 
placed by the TPLF on the ethnic element. During the liberation 
struggle, three organisations, besides the TPLF, became members of 
the EPRDF: 
- EPDM (Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement), an Amhara 
movement, as the later name of the organisation ANDM (Amhara 
National Democratic Movement) clearly indicates; 
- OPDO (Oromo People's Democratic Organisation), a movement 
for the Oromo; 
- EDORM (Ethiopian Democratic officers' Revolutionary Move-
ment): this organisation, which was disbanded after the liberation 
struggle, consisted of Derg officers who had been made prisoners 
of war by the TPLF. 
Note however that the TPLF had played a decisive role in the 
establishment and development of the three other organisations.
4
4 In 
March 1990, Meles Zenawi, the president of the TPLF and EPRDF, 
visited Washington and there he reportedly renounced Marxism-
Leninism which gained him the support of the United States. The 
collapse of the communistic bloc also led Mengistu to distance 
himself from Marasm-Leninism in March 1990. Mengistu did not 
however succeed in persuading the United States
4
5 and the successive 
victories of the Tigrayan and Eritrean Liberation movements increa-
singly undermined his position. On 21 May 1991 Mengistu, who had 
become desperate, fled to Zimbabwe where he was granted political 
asylum and the EPLF conquered Asmara, the capital of Eritrea on 24 
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34 May 1991.
4
6 On 28 May the EPRDF entered Addis Ababa and took 
47 
power. 
4. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
On 28 May 1991 EPRDF, EPLF and OLF announced in a joint 
declaration that on 1 July 1991 a large-scale national conference 
would be organised. This conference would discuss the details of the 
transitional period and the formation of a transitional government. In 
the meantime, the EPRDF would form a provisional administration.
4
8 
Meles Zenawi became acting head of state and Tamrat Layne, the 
president of ANDM, acting prime minister. The provisional EPRDF 
administration respected its commitment and, on 1 July 1991 it 
opened the national conference. The list of participants shows that 27 
Ethiopian political groups and organisations participated at the 
conference. Though representatives from Addis Ababa University, 
from workers and from political parties with a unitary ideology 
participated in the conference, most participants were representatives 
from ethnically organised political groups. Several of these groups had 
been created for the occasion, but others had a longer history and had 
provided a - substantial or less substantial - contribution to the poli-
tical and military struggle against Mengistu. The first issue that was 
discussed by the national conference was the acceptance of a 
"Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia. " The Transitional Charter, 
which was approved by the national conference, would act as "the 
supreme law of the land for the duration of the transitional period"
 49 
and was published on 22 July 1991 in the Negarit Gazeta (the Official 
Journal of Ethiopia). 
The Transitional Charter set out the fundamental structure and 
composition of the transitional government. The transitional govern-
ment consisted of a "Council of Ministers" and a "Council of 
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35 Representatives. " Article 7 of the Charter stated that the Council of 
Representatives would be composed of representatives of national 
liberation movements, other political organisations and prominent 
individuals, but the total number of seats was limited to 87. The 
members of the Council of Representatives were not elected, but 
designated by the organisations which they represented.
5
0 Initially, 24 
groups and organisations were represented in the Council of Repre-
sentatives, with a total of 81 seats. Most of the groups which were 
represented in the Council had also participated at the national confe-
rence. The largest number of seats (32) was allocated to the EPRDF 
and the OLF, with its 12 seats, became the second largest group. In 
September 1991 the remaining 6 seats were allocated to 5 movements 
which had not participated in the national conference.
5
1 The Charter 
provided for a prime minister and a council of ministers, but real 
executive power was exercised by the president. 
Furthermore, the Charter is particularly important because of its 
provisions which devote considerable attention to Ethiopia's multi-
ethnic population composition. These express the clear ambition of the 
drafters of the Charter to break with the past and to develop a new 
Ethiopian state which is based on the recognition and the equal 
treatment of all ethnic groups. The preamble of the Charter announces 
a new chapter in Ethiopian history "in which freedom, equal rights 
and self-determination of all the peoples shall be the governing 
principles of political, economic and social life and thereby contri-
buting to the welfare of the Ethiopian peoples and rescuing them from 
centuries of subjugation and backwardness. " The concern for the right 
to self-determination of the Ethiopian peoples was expressed in article 
2 of the Charter: 
"The right of nations, nationalities and peoples to self-determination 
is affirmed. To this end each nation, nationality and people is gua-
ranteed the right to: 
a. Preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture 
and history and develop its language; 
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36 b. Administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and 
effectively participate in the central government on the basis of 
freedom andfair and proper representation; 
c. Exercise its right to self-determination of independence, when the 
concerned nation/nationality and people is convinced that the 
above rights are denied, abridged or abrogated. " 
The Charter no longer talked about the Ethiopian people, but about 
different nations, nationalities and peoples; a terminology which is 
used up to today. These nations, nationalities and peoples were not 
only granted the right to protect their own language and culture, but 
also the right to self-administration within their own territory and the 
right to participation in the central government. The most remarkable 
provision is the allocation of a right to secession to the nations, 
nationalities and peoples, albeit that this right was conceived as a 
conditional right. The chapter of the Charter on the structure and 
composition of the transitional government equally reflected the aim 
of the new rulers to ensure, as widely as possible, the political partici-
pation of all ethnic groups. Article 9 stated that the head of state, the 
prime minister, the vice-chairperson and the secretary of the Council 
of Representatives had to be of different ethnic identities. In practice 
this provision was strictly observed. Meles Zenawi from Tigray was 
elected president by the Council of Representatives and the Amhara 
Tamrat Layne was appointed prime minister. The functions of vice-
chairman and secretary of the Council of Representatives were granted 
to a Gurage and a Kembata respectively.
5
2 
A final important topic which was discussed by the national 
conference was the future status of Eritrea. The EPLF wanted inde-
pendence for Eritrea and was therefore not interested in participating 
in the Ethiopian government. The EPLF formed its own provisional 
government in Eritrea which was headed by Issaias Afewerki. Eritrea 
thus became de facto independent in May 1991. The Ethiopian nation-
nal conference recognised the right of the Eritrean people to determine 
their political future through a referendum after a period of two years. 
The independence referendum was organised in April 1993 under the 
KINFE ABRAHAM, o.c, 445. 
37 supervision of the United Nations. Nearly all participants in the refe-
rendum voted in favour of Eritrean independence. Eritrea thus became 
de iure independent in May 1993. Eritrea concluded agreements with 
Ethiopia in the field of defence, security, trade and economics, but in 
the following years the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
deteriorated. A smouldering border conflict even resulted in a full 
scale war between the two countries in 1998. 
In the Transitional Charter it had already been indicated that an 
ethnically based decentralised state structure would be developed in 
Ethiopia. The above mentioned article 2(b) of the Transitional Charter 
stated that each nation, nationality and people of Ethiopia was entitled 
to self-administration within its own territory. Furthermore article 13 
stipulated that "local and regional councils ...defined on the basis of 
nationality" were to be established. The implementation of these 
provisions from the Charter was effectuated by Proclamation No. 
7/1992 of 14 January 1992: the "National/Regional Self-Governments 
Establishment Proclamation No. 7/1992." This law identified 64 
nations, nationalities and peoples or ethnic groups. These 64 groups 
were linked to 12 regions. Additionally, the cities of Addis Ababa and 
Harar were both made separate regions, bringing the total number of 
regions to 14. The determination of the regional boundaries was 
guided by the concern to create as many ethnically homogeneous 
regions as possible.
5
3 The limited number of regions (14) on the one 
hand and the large number of identified ethnic groups (64) on the 
other obviously implied that most ethnic groups did not have their 
own region. To realise the right to self-determination of all ethnic 
groups, the Proclamation stipulated that 47 of the 64 ethnic groups 
listed by the Proclamation had the right to establish self-government at 
the district (Wereda) level or above. Those ethnic groups that were not 
included in this group of 47 were to be considered as "minority 
nationalities" and had the right to appropriate representation in the 
Wereda council. Article 9(1) of Proclamation No. 7/1992 stated that 
the regional governments had within their territory legislative, 
executive and judicial powers in all matters which had not been 
assigned to the central government. Article 9(1) allocated different 
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38 powers to the central government. The central government was 
competent for defence, foreign affairs, economic policy, printing of 
currency, etc. Though the residuary powers were allocated to the 
regions by article 9, the legislator judged it necessary to explicitly 
allocate a number of competences to the regions in article 10. Hence, 
the regions were assigned the power to prepare, approve and imple-
ment their budget; to establish their security and police force and the 
power to establish their own judiciary. The regional authorities, 
however, remained accountable to the institutions of central govern-
ment. 
Proclamation No. 7/1992 was a milestone in the development of the 
Ethiopian state structure. The law laid the basis for an ethnically based 
decentralised state and indicated the road which, in the constitution of 
1995, would lead to the development of an ethnically based 
federation. 
In June 1992 elections were organised for the regional and district 
councils that had been created by Proclamation No. 7/1992. Initially, 
the elections had been planned to take place a lot earlier, but the 
political instability with which the transitional government was 
confronted in the first few months after the fall of the Mengistu 
regime made this impossible. Violent conflicts between armed 
political organisations ravaged several regions. Remarkably, the major 
conflict did not occur between the transitional government and the 
opposition, but between parties within the transitional government, the 
OLF and the EPRDF. The conflict was essentially about the political 
influence of the OLF at the central and regional level. Though the 
OLF had been granted 12 seats in the Council of Representatives, the 
front judged that its role in the transitional government was too 
limited. The OLF was also dissatisfied with the operation of the 
OPDO, the Oromo component within the EPRDF. The OLF consi-
dered itself to be the sole legitimate representative of the Oromo 
people and did not tolerate competition from the OPDO, which was 
denounced by the OLF as a TPLF satellite.
5
4 Besides the EPRDF and 
the OLF, the AAPO also played an important role in the election 
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39 struggle. The AAPO (All Amhara People's Organisation) had been 
created in January 1992. Although the party presented itself as a pan-
Ethiopian party, the AAPO, as can be inferred from its name, 
primarily defended the interests of the Amhara. The AAPO declared 
that it would defend Ethiopian unity and was a strong opponent of 
EPRDF's ethnic policy. Although the AAPO and the OLF pursued 
radically different political objectives, they were nevertheless united 
in their dissatisfaction with the EPRDF. Both parties complained 
about the military and political dominance of the EPRDF and judged 
that this prevented free and honest elections. Hence, a few days before 
the elections, the OLF and AAPO decided to boycott them. The 
boycott of its major competitors resulted in an easy victory for the 
EPRDF and the EPRDF-supported parties. The elections of June 1992 
laid the foundations for the EPRDF dominance which would be 
developed in the coming years and which is to this day a central 
characteristic of the Ethiopian political constellation. The EPRDF not 
only acquired control over the regional councils, but the events during 
the electoral process also caused the dominance of the EPRDF in the 
Council of Representatives. In the aftermath of its decision to boycott 
the elections, the OLF decided to withdraw from the transitional 
government and to relinquish its 12 seats in the Council of Represen-
tatives. This was the political context wherein preparations were made 
for the drafting of a new constitution. 
The Transitional Charter served as the "supreme law of the land"
5
5 and 
this remained the case until the coming into force of a new consti-
tution. The first phase in the drafting of the constitution was the 
establishment by the Council of Representatives of a constitutional 
commission. This commission would be entrusted with the drawing up 
of a draft constitution and it was to submit the draft to the Council of 
Representatives.
5
6 The constitutional commission was established in 
August 1992 with Proclamation No. 24/1992. The members of the 
commission were elected by the Council of Representatives from 
diverse social sections with a sound representation of civil society 
organisations. The Council of Representatives appeared to be striving 
for broad public support for the new constitution. However, oppo-
Art. 18 Transitional Charter. 
Art. 10 Transitional Charter. 
40 sition parties and some commentators adopted a critical attitude 
towards the commission and declared that the commission was 
controlled by the EPRDF.
5
7 From the beginning, the OLF therefore 
refused to participate in the constitutional debates. Although difficult 
to evaluate, there are indications that the complaints were not entirely 
unfounded. These indications are related to the dominant position of 
the EPRDF in the Council of Representatives. The regional and 
district elections of June 1992 had considerably reinforced the domi-
nant position of the EPRDF. The disappearance of the OLF had 
ensured EPRDF dominance in the Council of Representatives and this 
power position was only reinforced by the exclusion from the Council 
of four members of the SEPDC
5
8 in April 1993. Since the members of 
the constitutional commission were elected by the Council of Repre-
sentatives it is not unfair to state that the EPRDF played an important 
role in their selection.
5
9 Moreover, article 2(2) of Proclamation No. 
24/1992 stipulated that the commission was accountable to the 
Council of Representatives, which implied additional control by the 
Council of Representatives (and thus of the EPRDF) over the activi-
ties of the commission. In April 1994 the constitutional commission 
submitted a draft constitution to the Council of Representatives which 
in May 1994 unanimously adopted "The draft constitution of 
Ethiopia. " Following the example of the Transitional Charter, the draft 
constitution incorporated the ethnic diversity of the Ethiopian 
population in many provisions. The draft constitution recognised the 
right to self-determination of the nations, nationalities and peoples and 
created a federal state structure. It had already been stipulated in the 
Transitional Charter that the final text of the constitution would be 
adopted by an elected constituent assembly. Elections for a constituent 
assembly were organised on 5 June 1994. The main opposition parties 
again decided to boycott the elections. It is therefore not surprising 
that the results of the June 1994 elections showed a clear victory for 
the EPRDF. Hence the EPRDF also controlled the body charged with 
5
7 T.M. VESTAL, o.c, 48. 
5
8 Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Coalition: a coalition of several ethnically 
based parties. 
5
9 This does not mean that there was no political pluralism at all in the commission. 
The commission also had representatives from monarchical parties and centralist 
parties that could hardly be accused of subscribing to the EPRDF programme. 
41 the adoption of the final text of the constitution. The constituent 
assembly started its activities in October 1994 and approved the 
constitution on 8 December 1994. The constitution confirmed the right 
to self-determination of the nations, nationalities and peoples and 
affirmed the choice of a federal structure. Considering the dominance 
of the EPRDF in the constitutional process, the question could be 
asked whether these ethnic provisions - the most striking provisions in 
the constitution - were the exclusive reflection of EPRDF conceptions. 
The dominant role of the EPRDF made it indeed improbable that the 
constitutional provisions would not have been consistent with EPRDF 
conceptions. However, it has to be pointed out that both the right to 
self-determination and the choice of an ethnically based decentralised 
state were incorporated into the Transitional Period Charter. It has 
already been mentioned above that this Charter had been approved not 
only by the EPRDF, but by a relatively inclusive group of political 
parties and organisations. 
The last step in the transitional process was the organisation of 
elections - on the basis of the new constitution — to form a new, 
elected government. The constitution which was approved in 
December 1994 created a federal state structure with nine regional 
states.
6
0 At the federal level the constitution provided for a federal 
parliament with two chambers - the House of Peoples' Represen-
tatives (with members directly elected by the population) and the 
House of the Federation (with members elected by the regions) - and 
for regional parliaments in all of the nine regions. Furthermore, the 
constitution stated that the new federal government had to be formed 
by the political party or the coalition of political parties that had the 
majority in the House of Peoples' Representatives. Elections for the 
House of Peoples' Representatives and for the regional parliaments 
were organised in May 1995. Again the opposition parties judged that 
the conditions in Ethiopia prevented them from participating in the 
elections.
6
1 The opposition justified its decision to boycott with 
accusations aimed at the EPRDF about the arrest of opposition 
leaders, the closing of opposition offices and intimidation of 
These regional states are Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, 
Benishangul/Gvunuz, the Southern region, Gambella and Harar. 
6
1 The Indian Ocean Newsletter n° 658 (11 February 1995) and 659 (18-02-1995). 
42 opposition supporters. Hence, the elections provided the EPRDF with 
almost all the seats in the House of Peoples' Representatives and a 
majority in all regional parliaments.
6
2 The new constitution became 
effective on 21 August 1995 and a day later the establishment of the 
"Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia" was proclaimed. The next 
step was the composition and election of a new federal government 
and president (the latter is elected by a joint session of both chambers 
of parliament) that had to assume the powers of the transitional 
government. The almost absolute EPRDF control over the parliament 
resulted in the fact that both the new government and the new 
president were chosen from EPRDF ranks. However, a shift of 
political staff occurred. Meles Zenawi, the president from the 
transitional period, handed over the presidency (in the new constitu-
tion an essentially ceremonial function) to Dr. Negasso Gidada 
(OPDO) and became the new prime minister.
6
3 The former prime 
minister, Tamrat Layne, became deputy prime minister and minister 
of defence. 
Consistent with the constitutional provisions which state that the 
members of the House of Peoples' Representatives are elected for a 
term of five years, the next federal and regional elections were 
organised in May 2000. Although the opposition parties formulated 
the usual complaints about EPRDF mtimidation and obstruction, this 
time they did participate in the elections. Not only did the opposition 
parties participate, they effectively managed to send representatives to 
the federal parliament and some regional parliaments. However, the 
representation of the opposition remained extremely low. In the 
federal House of Peoples' Representatives more than 90% of the seats 
remained in the hands of the EPRDF and the EPRDF-controlled 
parties.
6
4 Hence, these elections confirmed the dominance of the 
EPRDF at federal level. The elections of 2000 equally confirmed the 
consolidation of direct or indirect EPRDF control over all regional 
K. TRONVOLL and O. AADLAND, The Process of Démocratisation in Ethiopia -
An Expression of Popular Participation or Political Resistance?, Oslo, Norwegian 
Institute of Human Rights, 1995, 15. 
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3 A position which Meles Zenawi holds to date. 
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4 "Ethiopia-Statistical Survey" in Africa South of the Sahara 2004, London/New 
York, Europa Publications, 2003, (419) 426. 
43 parliaments. During the elections of 2000, the EPRDF was composed 
of four parties: the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the 
Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Oromo 
People's Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and the South Ethiopian 
Peoples' Democratic Front (SEPDF). The first three parties were 
mentioned in section 3, the SEPDF was a party established for the 
several ethnic groups which live in the Southern regional state. 
Through these constituent parties, the EPRDF (of which the TPLF 
was still the most powerful component) managed to exert control over 
four regional states of the federation. In Tigray, the TPLF won all 152 
seats in the regional parliament, the ANDM won 286 of the 294 seats 
in the Amhara parliament and the OPDO won 535 of the 537 seats in 
the parliament of the Oromia region.
6
5 In the Southern region the 
opposition parties won a slightly larger number of seats; they held 23 
of the 346 seats in the first chamber of the Southern parliament.
6
6 In 
the other five states of the federation, the EPRDF had no such direct 
control over the regional parliaments. However, the EPRDF exerted 
indirect control through its satellite parties. These parties which are 
closely linked to the EPRDF exist in each of the five regions and the 
2000 elections resulted in the clear dominance of these parties within 
their respective regions.
6
7 
Today the EPRDF still dominates the federal parliament and the 
regional parliaments, be it that this dominance is less absolute than a 
few years ago. The federal and regional elections of May 2005 resul-
ted in a much more substantial representation of opposition parties in 
the federal parliament and most regional parliaments. With a view to 
gaining firmer parliamentary representation, the major opposition 
parties in the run-up to the 2005 elections united in two large coa-
litions: the UEDF (United Ethiopian Democratic Forces) and the CUD 
(Coalition for Unity and Democracy). The UEDF united parties with a 
Data provided by the NEB, the National Electoral Board. 
6
6 Information provided to the author by the Southern parliament. 
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7 The five EPRDF satellite parties in 2000: the Afar National Democratic Party 
(ANDP) in the Afar region; the Benishangul/Gumuz Peoples' Democratic Unity Front 
(BGPDUF) in Benishangul/Gumuz, the Gambella Peoples' Democratic Front (GPDF) 
in Gambella, the Somali People's Democratic Party (SPDP) in Somali and the Harari 
National League (HNL) in Harar. 
44 unitary ideology and ethnic parties in a broad, heterogeneous 
coalition. The CUD was mainly supported by parties which had their 
roots in Ethiopian nationalism. It was not only the opposition parties, 
but also the ruling EPRDF which indicated that they wanted to 
organise competitive elections in May 2005. The EPRDF declared that 
it would take the necessary measures to create a climate which was 
conducive to the organisation of free and fair elections. Whether this 
attitude of the EPRDF was stimulated by an inner conviction or, as 
some commentators argue, by the desire to satisfy foreign donors, the 
fact is that the EPRDF kept its word and created a positive atmosphere 
in the run-up to the elections. Opposition parties were granted access 
to the state media, international election observers were invited and 
debates were organised between EPRDF officials and opposition 
leaders. The elections themselves, which were held on 15 May 2005, 
were also characterised by a positive atmosphere. There was a high 
voter turn-out and there were no serious incidents. However, almost 
immediately after the elections this positive situation degenerated 
dramatically. Both the EPRDF and the opposition claimed victory. 
The opposition accused the EPRDF of massive election fraud and 
refused to accept the official results which showed a victory for the 
EPRDF. However, the victory claim of the opposition was not 
buttressed by international observers. The Carter Centre stated that: 
"The majority of the constituency results based on the May 15 polling 
and tabulation are credible and reflect competitive conditions.
1,68 
Although the official election results were contested by the opposition, 
these results nevertheless showed that the opposition had made 
enormous progress compared with the elections of 2000.
6
9 The CUD 
and UEDF won 109 and 52 seats respectively of the 547 seats in the 
House of Peoples' Representatives. In many regional parliaments the 
opposition also won a considerably larger number of seats, although 
without winning a majority in any of them.
7
0 The hope that these 
Final Statement on the Carter Center Observation of the Ethiopia 2005 National 
Elections, 15 September 2005. 
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9 The official election results can be found on the website of the National Electoral " 
Board of Ethiopia: http://www.electionsethiopia.org/Index.html 
7
0 In the council of Addis Ababa however, the opposition, and more specifically the 
CUD, won all seats except for one. Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia, has a 
more limited autonomy than the nine regions and is under the control of the federal 
government. 
45 election results would mean the final awakening of democracy in 
Ethiopia was undermined by the actions of both the EPRDF and the 
opposition. To protest against the alleged electoral fraud, the CUD 
refused to take up its seats in the federal parliament. Obviously, this 
decision was not such that it relieved tensions. After earlier violent 
incidents in June 2005, protests concerning the election results led in 
November 2005 to violent clashes between primarily young protestors 
and security forces that caused the deaths of dozens of people.
7
1 The 
response of the government was severe - the protests were repressed 
and there were many arrests. The leaders of the CUD were among the 
detainees. They were accused by the government of inciting violence 
and treason. The arrest of important opposition leaders was not the 
appropriate strategy in order to put the democratic process back on the 
rails. On 16 July 2007, the CUD leaders were sentenced by the court 
to life imprisonment, after the state prosecutor had called for the death 
sentence. The EPRDF controlled government however, under strong 
national and international pressure, took a pragmatic attitude towards 
the issue. Hence, the CUD leaders were granted pardon by the 
president and released a few days after they had been sentenced.
7
2 
Their release hopefully signifies the confirmation of the new, more 
democratic political culture that characterised the run-up to the 2005 
elections. After all, démocratisation is the only way to achieve 
sustainable stability, which is a requirement for long-term develop-
ment of the Ethiopian state. 
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